The first difference between these traditions is the emphasis on mortality per se. As PTG has been demonstrated in circumstances both including and not including direct reminders of mortality (e.g., cancer vs. divorce), an important initial question is what role death threat or reminders of mortality play in PTG. Reminders of mortality in the TMT tradition play a causal role in demonstrated effects, as these reminders are under the experimental control of the investigator. However, in naturalistic studies of PTG, reminders of mortality can coexist with changes in resources, lifestyle, or energy level. The determination of what role perceived mortality plays in PTG may be an important first step in understanding the differences between the PTG and TMT literatures.
A second difference between the PTG and TMT traditions is the duration of mortality reminders. The naturally occurring confrontations with death in the PTG literature tend to be on a longer term (typically days to years) than the experimental confrontations of death in TMT (typically seconds to minutes). Currently, the effect of length of mortality reminders on goal value has not yet been investigated empirically.
A third potential difference between the PTG and TMT traditions is the type of processing associated with mortality reminders in the two literatures. Cozzolino, Staples, Meyers, and Samboceti (2004) compared a TMT manipulation, which typically elicits more defensive processing such as distraction and optimistically biased appraisals (Pyszczynksi et al., 1999) , with a death-reflection manipulation in which participants focused on their own death in a manner consistent with PTG (Bower et al., 1998) , including an imagined real death, a life review, and the opportunity to take the perspective of others. Cozzolino et al. found that those who were initially extrinsically oriented and engaged in death reflection took fewer raffle tickets in return for their participation than if they processed death more generally and abstractly in the mortality-salience condition. These findings suggest that type of processing of death-related stimuli affects behavior associated with selfishness and greed, which in turn suggests changes in goal structure. However, although Cozzolino et al. investigated the influence of type of death processing, they did so on a cross-sectional basis, which did not allow for an examination of the influence of duration of processing.
The present studies used both naturalistic and experimental paradigms to investigate the influences of mortality threats and reminders, the passage of time, and type of processing on intrinsic and extrinsic goal value. In general, we hypothesized that mortality threats and reminders are associated with more intrinsic goal value, but only when these threats and reminders are prolonged and when thoughts about them are reflective.
STUDY 1
The influence of perceived death threat on goal shifts consistent with PTG was investigated in the context of the Northridge earthquake, which struck the Los Angeles area in the early morning hours of January 17, 1994, and measured 6.7 on the Richter scale. The experience of the earthquake could justifiably have reminded affected individuals of their own mortality: Fifty-seven people died as a direct result of the earthquake, including 16 crushed in a single apartment building that collapsed. More people died as an indirect result of the earthquake; for example, cardiac deaths in the area doubled on the day of the earthquake (Kloner, Leor, Poole, & Perritt, 1997) . Thousands of people were injured (Coffey, 1994) .
In a sample of hospital employees who experienced the Northridge earthquake in one of the Los Angeles areas most heavily damaged by the earthquake, we hypothesized that surviving the earthquake would lead to intrinsic goal shifts consistent with PTG literature, as their experience would include many long-term reminders of their own mortality. We further hypothesized that the degree of mortality threat experienced during the earthquake would be associated with the degree of intrinsic goal shift, such that greater threat would lead to larger shifts.
Method Participants
Participants were employees of the Sepulveda Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) in clinical, administrative, and support services. The Sepulveda VAMC is located less than 2 km from the epicenter of the Northridge earthquake and sustained severe damage. Most employees lived near the hospital in the San Fernando Valley, and most experienced damage to their homes and possessions in addition to the damage to their workplace and local infrastructure (roads, electric, gas, and water; G. F. Solomon, Segerstrom, Grohr, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1997) . The participants for this study were 74 employees who completed questionnaires at two waves after the earthquake. Mean age was 45 years (range = 24 to 66). The sample was 63% female and 30% minority. These participants were a subset of 113 participants who participated at Time 1. Those who continued at Time 2 tended to be slightly older than those who did not continue (M = 38 years), t(111) = 1.77, p < .10. However, there were no differences in gender or ethnicity or in any of the relevant study variables between those who continued and those who did not.
Procedure
Participants were approached by an investigator at their workplace. The purposes of the study, the procedure, and the planned follow-up waves were explained. To ensure a sample of people without severe mental health problems, participants were excluded if, previous to the earthquake, they had had a psychiatric hospitalization or were taking psychiatric medication or were currently experiencing distress so severe that they were not able to function in their normal activities. Participants were given questionnaires to be completed and returned in the mail. Some participants had been transferred to a nearby VAMC at Time 2 and were followed up at that site. Time 1 data were collected 11-24 days after the earthquake; Time 2 data were collected 53-67 days after the earthquake.
Measures
Demographic information. Participants were asked to report their gender, age, and ethnic background.
Life Goals Inventory. At Time 2, participants were asked to indicate how important 16 specific goals were to them before and after the earthquake on the Life Goals Inventory (Kemeny, 1995) . Responses were on a 7-point scale with endpoints 1 = not at all and 7 = extremely. The 16 goals were divided into two categories: intrinsic (9 items; e.g., cultivate close friendships, give and receive love, develop myself as a person, do creative work; α = .89) and extrinsic (7 items; e.g., be attractive, achieve acknowledgement and praise, have means or possessions, career advancement; α = .83). Following Kasser and Ryan (1996) , difference scores were calculated by subtracting the extrinsic scale mean from the intrinsic scale mean so positive values indicate the relative importance of intrinsic over extrinsic goals. The magnitude of the difference score relays information as to how much intrinsic goals are prioritized over extrinsic goals (Kasser & Ryan, 1996) .
Mortality threat. At Time 1, participants were asked, "At any time during the earthquake did you think you might die?" and responded on a 7-point Likert-type scale with endpoints 1 = not at all and 7 = absolutely. Participants reported a wide range of mortality threat. Mean response to this item was 3.0 (SD = 2.3), with a range from 1 to 7. Approximately one third of the sample responded at or above the scale midpoint.
Results

Mortality Threat and Changes in Goal Value
Changes in goal value are shown in Table 1 . There was no effect of the earthquake on goal value generally, so pre-event and current mean goal value reported at Time 2 were almost identical before and after the earthquake, F(1, 73) = 0.05, ns, η = .03. However, intrinsic goals were reported to be more valued after the earthquake than before, F(1, 73) = 6.48, p < .05, η = .29, and extrinsic goals were reported to be less valued, F(1,73) = 8.52, p < .05, η = .32. Consequently, there was a significant perception of goal shift, as represented by the intrinsic-extrinsic difference, from before to after the earthquake, F(1, 73) = 24.53, p < .05, η = .50.
Reports of a change in goal value from before the earthquake to 8 weeks after the earthquake, that is, perceived goal shift at Time 2, was significantly related to the perception that one's life was at risk during the earthquake as reported at Time 1. Thoughts of more certain death during the earthquake predicted a greater perceived goal shift (r = .38, p < .001). People who feared most for their lives during the earthquake were later most likely to endorse increased value placed on intrinsic goals (r = .24, p < .04) and, to a lesser degree, decreased value placed on extrinsic goals (r = -.19, p < .11).
Discussion
Following the Northridge earthquake, hospital employees reported shifts in their personal goals away from extrinsic goals such as "please people, be liked, popular" and "have means or possessions" and toward intrinsic goals such as "maintain close relationships with relatives" and "accomplish things in life." In addition, more certain thoughts of dying during the earthquake, recalled in the days afterward, predicted greater intrinsic goal shifts 6 weeks later. Thus, a reminder of one's death on the magnitude of surviving an earthquake appears to lead to intrinsic goal shifts. That greater perceived mortality threat during the earthquake predicted greater perceived intrinsic goal shifts over 8 weeks suggests that mortality threat does play a role in PTG. Although this finding does not dispute the additional role of changes in other areas such as resources, lifestyle, or energy level, this study does demonstrate that the magnitude of PTG outcomes is influenced by the magnitude of mortality threat. Thus, the differences between the PTG and TMT literatures cannot simply be explained by a lack of influence of mortality threat in PTG outcomes.
The question of whether people can accurately recall their previous goal values after they have experienced a traumatic event must be addressed. It is possible that after mortality threat, people devalue their prior intrinsic goals in order to perceive goal shift where none has actually occurred. One remedy would be to assess goals before and after a traumatic event; however, most such events are difficult to predict and therefore to study in a prospective design. Another remedy is to compare goal shifts occurring after mortality threat to those occurring after a benign event for which people should not be motivated to devalue their prior selves, as changes in the mortality threat group can be separated out from goal shifts normally reported over time. This approach was employed in Study 2, in which the influence of duration of mortality threat was also investigated.
STUDY 2
The influence of duration of mortality reminders was investigated by examining perceived goal shifts occurring over a 6-week period in a sample of midwestern undergraduate students who either vicariously experienced the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, or were completing a normal semester 3 years later. Mortality reminders associated with the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which killed almost 3,000 people, were experienced widely, albeit indirectly. Sixty-nine percent of American households were estimated to have watched prime-time television on the day of the attacks, when most programming focused on the terrorist attacks (Kissell, 2002) , and American adults were estimated to have watched approximately 8.1 hr of television coverage of the attacks by 3 to 5 days after the attacks (Schuster et al., 2001 ). This coverage included scenes of airplanes crashing into the World Trade Center, the wreckage of the planes that crashed into the Pentagon and the Pennsylvania countryside, and the extreme fear and distress experienced by those surviving the attacks. The extensive media coverage of the terrorist attacks following 9/11, as well as messages about the 4 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN continued threat of terrorism, likely served to remind many Americans of their own mortality. Preliminary evidence seems to support the experience of increased intrinsic goal value and PTG in Americans following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Americans reported higher levels of character strengths such as spirituality, hope, kindness, leadership, love, gratitude, and teamwork after the attacks of 9/11 than before (Peterson & Seligman, 2003) and reported the initiation of prosocial or altruistic behaviors, intensification of the quest for value or meaning and relational investment, and increased feelings of patriotism (Yum & Schnuck-Hamlin, 2005) .
Study 2 allows for an examination of the influence of duration of mortality reminders and additionally offers broader generalizability to life events. Because these participants experienced the 9/11 attacks vicariously, they did not experience mortality threat to the degree that the earthquake sample did. Such reminders are more likely to occur to the average person than are direct experiences, so evidence of goal shifts following indirect confrontations with mortality are more applicable to daily life.
We hypothesized, this time in a between-groups design, that a sample that had recently experienced the 9/11 terrorist attacks (the 2001 sample) would report greater intrinsic goal shifts than a sample that had not experienced a recent attack (the 2004 sample). We further hypothesized that these effects would be more evident with passage of time since the attacks.
Method Participants
The participants were 225 undergraduate students at a large midwestern university who participated for partial course credit. At the first of two time points (Time 1), 110 students participated in 2001, and 115 students participated in 2004. In 2001, the initial sample size decreased from N = 110 at Time 1 to n = 92 at Time 2 (16% attrition). In 2004, the initial sample size decreased from N = 115 to n = 95 (17% attrition). In 2001, there were no significant differences in age or gender between the individuals who completed the study and those who dropped out. However, a higher proportion of minorities dropped out of the study, χ 
Measures
Life Goals Inventory. At Time 1 and Time 2, participants were asked to complete the Life Goals Inventory (Kemeny, 1995) , in which they were asked to indicate how important the same 16 goals used in Study 1 were to them both currently and before a designated time point. In 2001, that time point was "before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , that time point was "before the beginning of the current semester." Alpha reliabilities were acceptable for all time frames at all time points (intrinsic, .79 to .84.; extrinsic, .73 to .79).
Data Analysis
To use a sample with a roughly equivalent experience with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, individuals who knew a close friend, relative, or acquaintance who was injured or killed (n = 22, with 11 knowing someone who was killed) were excluded from all analyses. Repeatedmeasure ANOVAs were conducted for the intrinsicextrinsic difference scores, using the Time 1 pre-event retrospective, Time 1 current, and Time 2 current values for each participant. Group (2001 vs. 2004 sample) was included as a between-subjects factor.
Results
Validity of Retrospective Reports of Goal Value
We employed two comparisons to assess the validity of retrospective reports of goal value prior to a threatening event. First, we calculated the differences between retrospective reports of pre-event goal value at two time points, 5 and 11 weeks after the event in 2001 and 8 and 14 weeks after the event in 2004. If motivational factors affect retrospective reports, then there may be changes in motivation and retrospective report between those two time points. Conversely, lack of change would tend to support accurate reporting. Test-retest reliability was high, with correlations between retrospective reports at Time 1 and Time 2 of .73 for intrinsic goals, p < .001, and of .73 for extrinsic goals, p < .001. Second, we compared retrospective reports by the sample asked to report on goal shifts after the terrorist attacks to those by the sample asked to report on goal shifts after starting college. If motivational factors affect retrospective reports, the former sample should devalue their pre-event goals relative to the latter. A repeated-measures ANOVA with goal type (within; extrinsic, intrinsic), time of retrospective report (within; Time 1 pre-event, Time 2 pre-event), and group (between; 2001, 2004) was conducted to examine these motivational factors. Overall goal values were consistent across time, F(1, 149) = 1.16, ns, η = .09, did not vary across time by group, F(1, 149) = 1.66, ns, η = .10, and did not vary by group and goal type across time, F(1, 149) = 2.31, ns, η = .12. These analyses demonstrate that the retrospective reports of pre-event goal value were not affected by motivational factors, as the reported pre-event goal values were consistent at Times 1 and 2 and did not vary by group or group by goal value at Times 1 and 2. Thus, for all analyses, the Time 1 preevent goal values will be used as the "before" value, due to its temporal proximity to the pre-event time frame.
Changes in Goal Value
From an initial equivalent pre-event difference score, t(149) = -1.58, ns, difference scores became more intrinsic over time in the combined sample, F(2, 296) = 20.24, p < .001, η = .35. However, this was qualified by a significant group by time interaction, F(2, 296) = 11.18, p < .001, η = .26, in which the 2001 group showed more intrinsic goal shift (difference scores of 0.61 pre-event, 1.93 at Time 1, and 1.72 at Time 2) than did the 2004 group (difference scores of 1.09 preevent, 1.40 at Time 1, and 1.08 at Time 2). Figure 1 shows the relative value of goals for the 2001 and 2004 groups: The group that was indirectly exposed to mortality threat reported a larger shift toward intrinsic goals than did the control group. The difference scores of the groups did not significantly differ at baseline (see above) or at Time 1, t(149) = 1.84, ns, though they significantly differed at Time 2, t(148) = 2.50, p = .01.
Discussion
A sample recently exposed to the 2001 terrorist attacks perceived greater intrinsic goal shift over time as compared with a parallel control sample assessed in 2004. Although the experimentally controlled, shortterm confrontations with death in TMT may trigger defensive processing, this study suggests that confronting more real-life and personal reminders of one's mortality may eventually promote psychological growth, as demonstrated in goal shifts, though it may not promote such growth immediately, as group differences were demonstrated at Time 2 but not at Time 1.
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that confronting more real-life and personal reminders or threats toward personal mortality can produce perceived intrinsic goal shifts consistent with PTG, suggest that degree of mortality threat is associated with degree of perceived intrinsic goal shift, and suggest that duration of processing does play an important role in goal shifts. However, these studies used traditional PTG paradigms in which people who were not randomly assigned to degree of mortality threat retrospectively reported changes in their goals. Furthermore, the influence of type of death-related processing has not yet been addressed. Thus, Study 3 used an experimental paradigm to examine the joint influences of duration of processing, type of processing, and pre-existing goal values 6 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN in determining the effects of reminders of mortality on perceived goal shifts.
STUDY 3
A midwestern student sample reported on current goal values both before and after completing 6 days of processing in one of three topic conditions: death reflection, mortality salience, or control (dental pain). The deathreflection manipulation was designed to capture the key elements of near-death experience, contains elements related to PTG, and may lead to shifts toward intrinsic goals (Cozzolino et al., 2004) , whereas the mortalitysalience manipulation was consistent with typical MS inductions that have resulted in shifts toward extrinsic goals (Routledge et al., 2004) . We hypothesized that type of processing would influence perceived goal values and goal shifts such that on Day 1, the participants in the death-reflection condition would report increased intrinsic goal value and lower extrinsic goal value than those in the mortality-salience condition, with those in the control condition reporting values between the two death-related groups. In addition, we hypothesized that duration of processing and type of processing would interact over the 6-day processing period. Those participants in the deathreflection condition would experience early intrinsic goal shift whereas those in the mortality-salience condition would report early extrinsic goal shift, but as a function of repeated mortality reminders, those in the mortalitysalience condition would also report intrinsic goal shift by Day 6. Those in the control condition would report minimal or no shift in goal values. Finally, we predicted that Day 1 goal values would interact with duration of processing and type of processing such that relatively intrinsic individuals would experience less positive change than relatively extrinsic individuals over the processing period because they already value intrinsic goals (Cozzolino et al., 2004) .
Method Participants
The participants were 149 undergraduate students at a large midwestern university who participated for partial course credit. Participants were eligible for the study if they were 18 years of age and were able to read and write in English. The initial sample size decreased from N = 149 at Day 1 to n = 103 at Day 6 (31% attrition). There were no significant differences in age, gender, or minority status between the individuals who completed the study and those who dropped out or were terminated from the study. In the sample of individuals completing the full study, mean age was 19.1 years (range = 18 to 29). The sample was 80% female and 10% minority.
Procedure
Three groups of participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, each of which involved 6 total days of participation. In the first sessions, each group of participants was seated in a common room, received information about the study, and signed an informed consent form. Participants then spent 10 min engaged in a processing task that consisted of answering open-ended essay questions that comprised the experimental manipulation. The participants also completed the demographic questionnaire, the Life Goals Inventory, and additional filler questionnaires.
Members of the death-reflection group were presented a vivid half-page scenario in which they were asked to imagine themselves caught in a building fire, frantically attempting to escape, but eventually succumbing to smoke and fire. They were then asked to describe the thoughts and emotions they felt while imagining the scenario, discuss how they would handle the final moments, describe the life they had led up to that point, and discuss how they think their family and friends would react if the event actually occurred. The mortality-salience group members were asked to simply describe the thoughts, feelings, and emotions that the thought of their own death aroused in them, as well as describing what they think will happen to them physically as they die. The dental-pain condition participants were asked a parallel set of questions related to dental pain, describing the thoughts, feelings, and emotions that the thought of dental pain aroused in them, as well as describing what they think will happen to them physically as they experience dental pain.
On the next 4 consecutive days (Days 2 to 5), participants completed their respective 10-min processing task, submitting their responses daily through the Internet. On Days 2 and 4, the death-processing group was asked to write about their thoughts and emotions and how they would handle the final moments; the mortality-salience group was asked to write about the thoughts, feelings, and emotions that the thought of their own death aroused in them; and the dental-pain group was asked to write about the thoughts, feelings, and emotions that the thought of dental pain aroused in them. On Days 3 and 5, the death-processing group was asked to write about the life they had led up to the point of their death and how their family and friends would react; the mortalitysalience group was asked to write about what will happen to them physically after death; and the dental-pain group was asked to write about what will happen to them physically as they experience dental pain.
On the final day of the study (Day 6), participants completed their final 10-min processing task, using the same prompts as on Day 1. They also again completed the Life Goals Inventory and additional filler questionnaires. After submitting their answers, participants were presented with online debriefing information. Student participants received research credits commensurate with the number of days they completed, but they were dropped from the study if they failed to submit their answers by midnight on any active study day.
Measures
Life Goals Inventory. On Days 1 and 6, participants were asked to complete the Life Goals Inventory (Kemeny, 1995) , in which they were asked to indicate how important the same 16 goals used in Studies 1 and 2 were to them currently. Alpha reliabilities were acceptable for all time frames at all time points (intrinsic, .67 on Day 1 and .83 on Day 6; extrinsic, .75 on Day 1 and .74 on Day 6).
Content Coding
Based on Cozzolino et al. (2004) , responses to the processing tasks on Days 1 and 6 were coded using 12 categories: positive affect; negative affect; physical reality of dying or dental pain (e.g., pain); physical reactions to thinking about death or dental pain (e.g., increased heart rate, "stomach dropped"); life reflections or summary; life goals; life regrets; thoughts of others; selfish thoughts of others; religious references; personal mortality (e.g., "I know I am going to a better place"); and universal mortality ("Death is natural or inevitable"). Initially, two raters coded each of 45 responses, yielding alpha reliabilities of .78 to .99. Following discussion of disagreements, individual raters then coded the remaining responses. Following Cozzolino et al., all content codings were transformed into proportions (content category coding matches/total content coding matches) for each participant to account for individual differences in the length of responses. Distributions of these proportions were skewed and therefore were square-root transformed to improve normality.
Results
Content Differences Among Groups
One-way ANOVAs with Bonferroni correction (α = .004) revealed significant differences among the three experimental groups in all categories of response content except positive affect, negative affect, and selfish thoughts of others. Table 2 shows the group means of the squareroot transformed variables on Day 1. To summarize, the dental-pain group had the most references to physical reality and physical reactions; both death-topic groups had more references to religion than the dental-pain group; the mortality-salience group had more references to mortality, both personal and universal, and life goals than the other two groups; and the death-reflection group had more references to life reflection, life regrets, and thoughts of others than the other two groups. These patterns were maintained at Day 6, with the exceptions that the death-reflection group had more references to life goals than the dental-pain group, and the difference in life regrets between death reflection and mortality salience no longer reached Bonferroni-corrected significance.
Goal Differences Among Groups
At Day 1, for the total sample, there were no significant group differences in intrinsic or extrinsic goal value or in goal value difference scores. For the sample that 8 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN completed through Day 6, there were no significant differences on Day 1 between groups in their extrinsic goal value or in the difference scores. The groups did differ significantly in their intrinsic goal value, F(2, 102) = 3.37, p < .05, η = .24, with the dental-pain group members reporting higher value attached to intrinsic goals (M = 53.52) than either death-processing group (death reflection M = 50.09; mortality salience M = 50.55). On Day 6, there were no significant differences between groups in their goal value difference score after controlling for Day 1 goal value, F(2, 89) = 0.04, ns, η = .03. However, there was an interaction between group and initial goal value, F(2, 89) = 3.92, p < .05, η = .28. Figure 2 shows the results from regression models run for each group, with low initial values equal to -1 SD and high initial values equal to +1 SD. First, there was evidence for regression toward the mean; those with high initial values tended to decrease, whereas those with low initial values tended to increase. However, this tendency differed significantly among groups. Participants with high initial values decreased the least in the death-reflection group and most in the mortality-salience group; participants with low initial values increased the most in the mortalitysalience group and least in the death-reflection group. The impression that the differences in goal change were driven by the two death-topic groups is confirmed by a significant interaction between initial goal value and these two groups, F(1, 61) = 7.21, p < .05, η = .33; the interaction was not significant when restricted to either death-topic group and the dental-pain group.
Analysis of intrinsic and extrinsic goals separately suggested that this effect was due to their combined influence on the difference score, because the initial value by group interaction was not significant for either one: intrinsic, F(2, 89) = 1.43, ns, η = .17; extrinsic, F(2, 89) = 2.03, ns, η = .20.
Initial Goals and Content Changes
The possibility that content changes mediated these differences was explored in the two death-topic groups. After Bonferroni correction (α = .004) and controlling for initial content, there were several main effects of group at Day 6 such that the death-reflection group was lower in physical reality and higher in life reflection and thoughts of others. There were no significant interactions between initial content and group; the largest effect was for life reflection (p < .01). However, controlling for life reflection at Day 1 and Day 6 did not affect the initial goal value by group interaction, F(1, 59) = 7.64, p < .05, η = .35. Therefore, this particular content category did not account for the effect of group and initial goal value on later goal value.
Discussion
Duration and type of processing and pre-existing goal values are all important to the type of outcomes observed or perceived following a prolonged confrontation with reminders of personal mortality. Although no reliable group differences were found in difference scores at Day 1 or in goal shifts occurring from Day 1 to Day 6, individuals who reported more intrinsic goals at Day 1 appeared most able to maintain their intrinsic goal orientation across time in the death-reflection condition, whereas individuals with higher extrinsic goals at Day 1 appeared to experience the most intrinsic goal shifts in the mortalitysalience condition. Thus, some combinations of pre-existing goal values and processing type are more psychologically advantageous across time t han others. Death reflection led to the most intrinsic goal value for individuals who were already intrinsically oriented and the least for those who were already extrinsically oriented. Following confrontations with mortality, processing focused on the quality of one's life to date (e.g., reflection, regrets) may reinforce the value of intrinsic goals for those who already value them but may also reinforce extrinsic goal values for those who already value them. In contrast, rehearsal of one's own theory of what happens to oneself, one's body, or humans generally following death, which was the content of the processing conducted by the mortalitysalience group, may actually lead to more intrinsically oriented goals over time for individuals who possess more extrinsic goals initially.
The experimental groups maintained their content differences over time, suggesting that extrinsically oriented individuals are not simply changing the nature of their processing over time to produce intrinsic goal shifts. This suggests that the psychological outcomes of prolonged processing of death reminders may be influenced by the "match" between type of goal structure (deep for intrinsic, shallow for extrinsic) and type of processing done (deep for death reflection, shallow for mortality salience). Unlike Cozzolino et al. (2004) , we did not find effects of condition in our cross-sectional data analysis, and the longitudinal patterns suggested here are almost completely opposite. However, we examined perceived goal values at two time points, whereas Cozzolino et al. examined a behavioral outcome. It is possible that behavioral changes dissociate from goal values, at least after acute experimental manipulation, or that altruistic behavior is unrelated to generally intrinsic and extrinsic goal values as measured by the Life Goals Inventory. Furthermore, the content analysis patterns are generally consistent with Cozzolino et al. but do not match exactly. Thus, future work needs to examine how outcome type and content type affect the results of death reflection.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
PTG and terror management findings appear contradictory, with PTG suggesting that confrontations with death lead to intrinsic goal shift and TMT suggesting that they lead to extrinsic goal shift. The present studies demonstrate that differences in duration of those confrontations and the type of processing that occurs afterward are important factors in determining the type of goal change that results. Studies of PTG typically include long-term reminders of death, which appear to promote maintenance of intrinsic goals or intrinsic goal shifts. Alternately, studies in TMT typically include very short-term reminders of death, which here led to no discernable group differences but in other studies have elicited behavior consistent with extrinsic goal values such as greed and vanity (Cozzolino et al., 2004; Routledge et al., 2004) . Although individual goal valuation and type of processing influence goal outcomes, the main factor influencing differences between PTG and TMT results may be the influence of time, as longer duration of processing was related to outcomes consistent with PTG across all studies. The current research suggests that when people encounter death over a longer period of time or in a manner consistent with their goal structure, they move to transcend their defensiveness, maintain or become more intrinsically oriented, and may end up healthier in the long term.
Research on the correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic goals demonstrates that the relative centrality of intrinsic goals is positively related to well-being, adjustment, and self-actualization and is negatively related to anxiety. In contrast, the relative focus on extrinsic goals is related to lower levels of happiness, higher susceptibility to psychological disorders in adolescents, and less loving and more conflicted relationships with friends and romantic partners (Kasser, 2002; Kasser & Ryan, 1996; Schmuck, Kasser, & Ryan, 2000; Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, & Kasser, 2004) . In addition, individuals valuing extrinsic over intrinsic goals may adopt contingencies of self-worth, make more frequent social comparisons, and diminish time available for intrinsic goals . Thus, maintaining an intrinsic goal orientation (as intrinsically oriented individuals did best in the death-reflection condition) or making an intrinsic shift in goal valuation (as did the extrinsically oriented individuals in the mortality-salience condition) across time will likely maintain or lead to new, qualitatively positive effects. As intrinsic goal shifts appear to lead to the building of important resources (i.e., close relationships, feelings of competence), it is difficult to imagine that these effects would be transient. Thus, long-term changes in goal value appear possible as a link between confrontations with death and PTG.
Of course, Study 3 suggests that psychologically advantageous goal shifts or the maintenance of healthier goal values will only occur following processing that is matched to an individual's goal value structure over time, which suggests that the current findings may be used in an intervention framework. Encouraging intrinsically oriented individuals who are confronting death to reflect on life, process life regrets, and think of others may promote PTG through continued valuation of intrinsic goals. Alternately, encouraging individuals with more extrinsic goals to process their theory of what happens following death as well as current life goals may help promote PTG over time through intrinsic goal shifts. However, a mismatch between level of processing and goal values may lead to a devaluation of intrinsic goals, or extrinsic shifts. Very traumatic events or reminders of one's mortality create tremendous psychosocial needs. Thus, it is quite important to ensure that clinicians are helping clients face death in a manner that will have the most psychologically beneficial outcomes, and the current research suggests that goal values and type of processing must be considered before beginning an intervention, though death-reflection processing may be feasible for all individuals, initially or once their goals begin to become more intrinsically oriented. The promotion of PTG is a reasonable therapeutic goal; for example, it mediates the physiological benefit of cognitive-behavioral therapy in breast cancer patients (Cruess et al., 2000; McGregor et al., 2004) .
Although this series of studies resolves much of the PTG versus TMT paradox, there are important questions remaining. In the absence of information on processing type in Studies 1 and 2, the three-way interaction of processing type, initial goal value, and duration could only be examined in Study 3. In addition, work examining the influence of all three factors in naturally occurring confrontations with death is necessary, as the only study examining the influence of all three factors simultaneously was an experimental study. However, the current studies do point to the influences of all three factors and interactions between the factors that may have clinical importance in longterm psychological outcomes. The literature would benefit from future studies examining such questions as whether different types of mortality reminders automatically trigger different types of processing, whether people with different goal-value structures are naturally drawn to different types of processing, why a match between goal values and processing type is more advantageous than a mismatch, and how long goal shifts following mortality reminders are maintained. Further work using both experimental and naturalistic methods may help illuminate why duration of processing appears to lead to beneficial outcomes in naturally occurring confrontations with death such as those examined in Studies 1 and 2.
Confrontations with mortality are a fact of life. With the extensive access to news outlets in our society, the goal to stay informed about world events can induce frequent reminders of mortality. However, the current research suggests that reminders of our own mortality can lead to beneficial outcomes such as intrinsic goal shifts over time, with the caveat that an individual's goal-value structure and the type of processing may need to be matched with one another. Furthermore, when reminders of mortality reach the quality of trauma, as in life-threatening disease or disaster, intrinsic goal-structure maintenance or intrinsic shifts may produce PTG by building up personal and relational resources that the individual can draw upon in times of need. Intrinsic goals may allow for growth, instead of immobility or defensiveness, to occur following a confrontation with the inevitability of mortality.
